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Employee Participation Programs After
Electromation: They're Worth the Risk!
K Bruce Stickler*
Patricia L. Mehler**
I. INTRODUCTION
Employee participation programs ("EPPs") 1 have been hailed as
"the most positive and important development in U.S. labor-man-
agement relations in the last 20 years.... 2 A myriad of employ-
ers, including those in the healthcare industry, apparently agree.
More than 80% of the largest employers in the United States-
nearly 30,000 employers-have implemented some form of EPP.3
EPPs allow management to utilize a valuable resource, the em-
ployees' firsthand knowledge of the employer's strengths and
weaknesses. EPPs also empower employees by giving them a role
in making decisions about matters that affect their jobs. In a clas-
sic example of form over substance, the National Labor Relations
Board ("the Board") recently found that an electronics manufac-
turer's EPPs violated federal labor law and ordered that the em-
ployee committees be disbanded.4 The Board's decision in
* K. Bruce Stickler is a partner and Director of the Labor and Employment Law
Group of Keck, Mahin & Cate in Chicago, Illinois. He received his B.A. and J.D. de-
grees from Southern Methodist University. Mr. Stickler represents management in em-
ployment and labor relations matters, including a number of religious orders, hospitals,
and health care institutions. He has served as Labor Counsel to the American Hospital
Association and the Illinois Hospital Association. Mr. Stickler has written many articles
and lectured extensively throughout the country on labor and employment law issues.
** Patricia L. Mehler is an associate attorney at Keck, Mahin & Cate in Chicago,
Illinois. She received her B.S. from University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana and her
J.D., cum laude, from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Miss Mehler concen-
trates her practice in labor and employment law.
1. Employee participation programs are committees of management and nonsupervi-
sory employee representatives that meet to address workplace issues. They often deal
with quality, productivity, efficiency, or safety issues, though their purposes can be unlim-
ited. Numerous types of EPPs may exist; some of the more common EPPs include "qual-
ity circles," "total quality management (TQM)," "continuous quality improvement
(CQI)," and "work-life quality" task forces.
2. Letter from Congressman Steve Gunderson (R-Wis.) to the Members of the House
of Representatives (Mar. 1, 1993) (on file with the Institute for Health Law).
3. Id.
4. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 5 Lab. L. Rep. (1992-1993 NLRB
Dec.) (CCH) 17,609, at 32,970 (Dec. 16, 1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th Cir.
Dec. 28, 1992).
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Electromation, Inc. left countless employers wondering about the
legality of their own EPPs. This article explores Electromation and
its aftermath, particularly as applied to the healthcare industry.
II. THE ELECTROMA TION DECISION
Electromation, Inc., an Indiana corporation, manufactures elec-
trical components.' Due to financial losses, the company modified
certain employee benefits. After a number of employees com-
plained about the reduced benefits, Electromation created five
EPPs called "Action Committees." The Action Committees were
designed to resolve the problems raised by the employees. Repre-
sentatives of both employment and management sat on each
committee.
The National Labor Relations Board found that the company's
"Action Committees" violated § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("the Act"),6 which prohibits employer domination, in-
terference, or support of a labor organization. The Board's
analysis of § 8(a)(2) required two distinct determinations, both of
which are necessary to find a violation. First, the Board deter-
mined that the Action Committees constituted a "labor organiza-
tion" as defined in § 2(5) of the Act. Second, the Board found
that the employer's involvement with those committees constituted
"unlawful domination and support."9
An employee committee qualifies as a labor organization if it 1)
involves employee participation, 2) "deals with" the employer, and
3) concerns grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours, or other work
conditions.10 Like all EPPs, Electromation's Action Committees
involved employee participation, thereby fulfilling the first prong of
the statutory definition of a labor organization.
The Board then examined whether the committees existed, at
5. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,971.
6. Id. at 32,978.
7. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). Congress
enacted § 8(a)(2) to avoid sham unions, which were created and dominated by the com-
pany but gave the employees the impression that their interests were represented. The
original proponent of the Act, Senator Wagner, explained: " '[O]nly representatives who
are not subservient to the employer with whom they deal can act freely in the interest of
employees.'" Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,974 (citing I LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 15-16 (GPO 1949)).
For further discussion of the legislative history of § 8(a)(2), see Electromation, Inc., 5
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,973-75, 32,981-82.
8. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,979.
9. Id. at 32,980.
10. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
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Employee Participation Programs
least in part, to "deal with" the employer. The Board, noting that
the employer created these committees to discuss and mutually re-
solve employee complaints, stated: "This is the essence of 'dealing
with' [the employer]."11 Thus, the Action Committees satisfied the
second prong of the statutory definition of a labor organization.
The third prong of the statutory definition requires that the ex-
change between the employer and employees concern traditional
subjects of collective bargaining--conditions of work, grievances,
labor disputes, wages, or hours. The Board found that Electroma-
tion's Action Committees dealt with employee benefits, which can
be both conditions of work and wages.12 Thus, the third prong was
also met.
Having found the Action Committees to be a "labor organiza-
tion" within the meaning of the statute, the Board then examined
whether Electromation, as the employer, unlawfully dominated,
interfered with, or supported the Action Committees in violation
of § 8(a)(2). 13 The Board delineated several factors indicating em-
ployer domination and support. These factors include the em-
ployer's role in suggesting the committee, determining its purposes,
writing its bylaws or other governing rules, determining the
number of committee members, establishing the complement of
representatives from management and the work force, drafting
goals, setting restrictions on which employees may participate, se-
lecting the subjects to be discussed, scheduling the meeting times
and places, financially supporting the committee, and paying for
time spent by the employees while attending meetings. 4
The Board found that Electromation's influence over the Action
Committees was so pervasive as to constitute unlawful domination
and support.' 5 First, it was Electromation's decision to create the
Action Committees. Electromation also established the entire
structure of the committees: it determined the purposes and goals,
the topics to be discussed, the number of members on each com-
mittee, and the individuals who would serve as management repre-
sentatives. Electromation also financially supported the
committees by allowing them to meet on company time and com-
pany property. Given the employer's conduct, the Board found
"no doubt" as to the existence of a § 8(a)(2) violation. 16
11. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L Rep. (CCH) at 32,979.
12. Id. at 32,978-79.
13. Id. at 32,979-80.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 32,980.
16. Id. at 32,979.
1993]
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III. EMPLOYEE COMMITTEES AFTER ELECTROMATION
The Electromation decision does not prohibit all EPPs. The
Board was careful to note that its determination was limited to the
facts of the case and that not all employee committees would be
considered unlawful.' 7 Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor, com-
mented recently that he considered the Electromation decision to
be a "narrow" one, noting that "[t]he last thing we want it to do is
cast a chilling effect" on mutually beneficial employment
initiatives. 18
Congress also has indicated its intention to construe Electroma-
tion narrowly. Three months after the Electromation decision,
Congressman Gunderson (R-Wis.) introduced the Teamwork for
Employees and Management ("TEAM") Act of 1993, which
would severely limit the impact of Electromation. ' 9 On March 30,
1993, Senator Kassebaum (R-Kan) introduced a companion bill.2"
Additionally, in the One Hundred Third Congress, both the House
and the Senate are considering legislation to reform the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA").2 Both OSHA
reform bills would require that employers with more than ten em-
ployees establish a safety and health committee that includes both
employer and employee representatives to deal with safety
concerns.
2 2
Until legislation limiting the impact of Electromation becomes
law, employers must look to the Board for guidance on the legality
of their EPPs. Under Electromation, employers may avoid having
their employee committees declared unlawful by one of three
means. First, EPPs that do not "deal with" the employer do not
constitute "labor organizations" under § 2(5) of the Act and thus
cannot violate § 8(a)(2). 23 Second, EPPs that do not concern em-
17. Id. at 32,971.
18. Employee Involvement is Critical to Success of Companies, Reich Says, Daily La-
bor Report (BNA) No. 44, at A-5, A-6 (Mar. 9, 1993).
19. H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Gunderson Bill WouldAmend NLRA To
Allow For Participation Programs, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 60, at A-14, A-15
(Mar. 31, 1993).
20. S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
21. S. 575, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Senators Kennedy (D-Mass.)
and Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) on Mar. 11, 1993). Congressman Ford (D-Mich) introduced
the House's version of the bill, H.R. 1280, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), on March 10,
1993.
22. S. 575, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1993) (amending § 28 of the 1970 Act). Sec-
tion 201 of the House bill also mandates establishment of a safety and health committee
in each qualifying company. H.R. 1280, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1993).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (1988).
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ployee grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours, or work conditions
also do not constitute "labor organizations. '24 Third, an employer
may reduce the likelihood of a § 8(a)(2) violation by minimizing its
influence on the EPP.
While § 8(a)(2) of the Act prohibits employer domination of a
labor organization, there can be no § 8(a)(2) violation if a commit-
tee does not constitute a "labor organization" within the meaning
of the statute.2 - To qualify as a labor organization, a committee
must "deal with" the employer. A committee "deals with" the em-
ployer if it attempts to mutually resolve issues. The Board ex-
plained: "[w]e view 'dealing with' as a bilateral mechanism
involving proposals from the employee committee. . . , coupled
with real or apparent consideration of those proposals by manage-
ment. A unilateral mechanism, such as a "suggestion box," or
"brainstorming" groups or meetings, or analogous information ex-
changes, does not constitute 'dealing with.' "26
In a subsequent decision, the Board further defined the differ-
ences between a unilateral and a bilateral mechanism.27 The Board
stated that a bilateral mechanism involves a "pattern or practice"
of employee proposals followed by management's response to those
proposals, though actual resolution of the proposals through com-
promise would not be required. Where only "isolated instances" of
employee proposals exist, however, "the element of dealing [with]
is missing."'2 8 Additionally, the Board stated that the presence of
management representatives on the EPP would not, in itself, con-
stitute "dealing with" management. If the EPP was empowered to
act on its own and the management representatives had no vote or
only constituted a minority of the committee, the EPP would not
be "dealing with" management.29
Thus, one way to minimize the possibility of a § 8(a)(2) violation
is to use employee committees as a mechanism for input, without
agreeing to respond to that input. The downside of using commit-
tees in this manner is that it strips the employees of their active
role in decision making. Presumably, the quality of the participa-
tion on such a committee would be less enthusiastic than on a com-
mittee designed for the mutual benefit of both the employer and
24. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
25. Id.
26. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,976 n.21.
27. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 1993 WL 191471 (May
28, 1993).
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *3.
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the employees. Thus, creating an EPP that serves only as a sugges-
tion mechanism may well defeat one of the main purposes in creat-
ing the EPP and therefore may not be a viable option.
Another way to avoid a § 8 (a)(2) violation is to create an EPP
that does not concern the traditional subjects of collective bargain-
ing. Federal labor law distinguishes between "mandatory" and
"permissive" subjects of bargaining. Mandatory subjects are those
that an employer must negotiate with the employee's representa-
tive (the labor organization). 30 Permissive subjects may be the sub-
ject of bargaining, but need not be. Mandatory subjects of
bargaining include employee grievances, labor disputes, wages,
hours, and other conditions of work.3 1 Hence, a committee that
purports to resolve issues regarding these mandatory subjects
usurps the role of an elected employee representative and thus
qualifies as a labor organization.
The scope of the five mandatory subjects of bargaining-griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, hours, and conditions of work-is
fairly broad. Wages, for example, include all forms of compensa-
tion-bonuses, shift differentials, overtime pay, merit increases, the
method of pay calculation, and pay for employees on the bargain-
ing committee during contract negotiations.32 Employee benefits,
which were at issue in Electromation, could be considered either
wages (e.g., vacation pay) or conditions of work (e.g., attendance
programs).33 To avoid being considered a labor organization, an
employee committee must avoid discussing any of these five
mandatory subjects of bargaining, including any related issues en-
compassed within each subject.
On April 15, 1993, the Board's General Counsel, Jerry M.
Hunter, issued a memorandum to the Board's offices to provide
further guidance on Electromation.3 4 The memorandum warned
that the Board considers safety issues to be mandatory subjects of
30. Of course, negotiation of mandatory subjects is only required where a properly
recognized employee representative exists.
31. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) ("wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment"); Labor Management Relations ("Taft-
Hartley") Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) ("rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment"). See also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
(Patrick Hardin, 3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW).
32. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 31, at 864-66, 876-77, 927.
33. For a discussion of the Board cases establishing mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing, see id. at 863-928.
34. NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem. 93-4 (Apr. 15, 1993), reprinted in Daily Labor Report
(BNA) No. 78, at G-1 (Apr. 26, 1993).
[Vol. 2
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bargaining. 35 Thus, safety committees that meet the statutory defi-
nition of a labor organization may violate § 8(a)(2) if employer
domination, interference, or support is also indicated.
In Electromation's concurring opinions, Board members stated
that employee committees designed to address issues of productiv-
ity, product quality, and efficiency would be lawful;36 these issues
concern aspects of employment that generally remain within the
prerogative of management to dictate. Because these managerial
issues are not mandatory subjects of bargaining, they can be freely
discussed.37
Thus, EPPs designed to deal with issues of productivity, effi-
ciency, or quality will likely be safe from the reach of Electroma-
tion.38 The challenge will be to keep the committee focused on
those topics. Addressing any topic without discussing the closely
intertwined mandatory bargaining subjects may be difficult. 39 The
employer must be prepared to contend with this possibility, re-
minding the committee that federal labor law prohibits such dis-
cussions in EPPs.
In addition to safeguarding productivity, quality, and efficiency
committees, the Board also noted that an EPP that performs
strictly managerial or adjudicative functions does not constitute a
labor organization.' Because such a committee performs func-
tions for management, the Board does not consider the committee
to be "dealing with" the employer as an advocate for the em-
ployee.41  Further, such committees do not qualify as labor
organizations.
The Board considers an adjudicative committee to be a substi-
tute for management if the committee has the sole authority to
decide employee grievances, just as management would.42 "Fair
treatment" and "grievance" committees would thus be lawful if
35. Id. at G-5.
36. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,980-85 (Devaney, concurring),
32,985-86 (Oviatt, concurring), 32,987-97 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
37. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,977.
38. Thus, health care institutions that have established quality assurance committees
to enforce Joint Commission of Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations standards pre-
sumably do not violate the Act.
39. The General Counsel Memorandum of Electromation warns that a productivity
or efficiency EPP may still be considered a labor organization "if it engages in direct
dealing over mandatory terms and conditions of employment, or over matters that will
have a substantial impact upon mandatory working conditions." Daily Labor Report
(BNA) No. 78, at G-5.
40. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,977.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 182, 1108, 1121 (1977).
1993]
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they were authorized to make final decisions as to a grievance. For
example, a committee that decided employee grievances at the
third stage of a four-stage grievance procedure would not consti-
tute a labor organization as long as its decision was final as to the
third stage of the procedure. If such a committee only recom-
mended a course of action to management, however, it would be
"dealing with" the employer.
The third way in which an employer can reduce the likelihood of
a § 8(a)(2) violation is to minimize its domination of the commit-
tee. An employer demonstrates employer domination when it
determines the structure of the committee, by establishing or con-
trolling its bylaws, rules, purposes, or goals, determining the topics
to be discussed, scheduling meetings, or limiting or selecting the
number of members and those employees who may participate.43
Additionally, if the employer financially supports the committee or
pays its employees for time spent on committee activities, the em-
ployer takes the risk that its support will be considered unlawful."
Employers with committees should consider their domination
and support of those committees in light of the above factors. Un-
fortunately, the Board did not provide any guidance on how many
of these factors are required to constitute unlawful domination, in-
terference, or support. If an examination reveals more than negli-
gible domination, interference, or support, the employer should
consider dissolving the current committees and, if desirable, refor-
mulating new committees according to the above standards. Sim-
ply reducing the employer's involvement in existing committees
may not be enough. The employer in Electromation, when faced
with a union election, withdrew its involvement from its commit-
tees pending the election results. The Board found that the em-
ployer's withdrawal was insufficient. Because management's
influence pervaded the committees' entire structure, the Board
held that disestablishment was necessary.4 5
As further cases are decided, the line between lawful and unlaw-
ful committees will become clearer. Until then, Electromation and
previous Board decisions indicate the following guidelines.
43. Electromation, Inc., 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,979-80.
44. Id. However, the General Counsel Guideline Memorandum indicates that al-
lowing an EPP to meet on company time and property will not be considered per se
unlawful. Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 78, at G-7.
45. Id.
[Vol. 2
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LAWFUL
*unilateral
mechanisms:
employee
input without
employer
action
(brainstorming,
suggestion
boxes)
'quality circles,
productivity, or
efficiency
committees
*managerial or
adjudicative
committees
*formulation and
structure of
committee
determined by
employees;
minimal
employer
influence
UNDECIDED UNLAWFUL
*bilateral
mechanisms:
negotiation or
other attempts
at mutual
resolution
of issues
'employee
health
committees
46
*employer
financial
support
without other
support
oa level of
employer
involvement
less than total
domination of
structure
*grievances,
labor disputes,
wages, hours,
conditions of
work, and
related items
*safety
committees 47
'creation,
structure,
function, and
continued
existence of
committee
determined by
employer
IV. HEALTHCARE EPPs
There are as many forms of EPPs as there are employers. That
fact, coupled with the Board's failure to provide adequate guidance
on the extent of employer involvement required for a § 8(a)(2) vio-
lation, makes it difficult to devise a formula by which employers
46. In E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 1993 WL 191471
(May 28, 1993), the Board cast doubt on the lawfulness of employee health committees.
Without much analysis, the Board found that the employer's committees that discussed
picnic areas and jogging tracks involved employee "benefits," which are prohibited
subjects for EPPs. Id. at * 1.
47. But see note 22.
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can judge the legality of their EPPs. The following two hypotheti-
cals attempt to illustrate the application of the § 8(a)(2) analysis.
General Hospital, a large, tertiary care, for-profit institution in a
large Northeastern city, established an "Employee Advisory Com-
mittee" based on employees' suggestions. The committee's pur-
pose is to provide input to management about benefit plans.
The committee's membership consists mostly of employees.
General hired a consulting company to assist in establishing and
running the committee. Management personnel from Human Re-
sources also sit on the committee. Otherwise, management ap-
pears not to have a large role; they are only to be apprised of the
committee's progress.
At first glance, General's committee may appear to pass muster
under Electromation. Both its name ("advisory committee") and
its stated purpose of "providing input" suggest that the committee
is lawful as a unilateral mechanism for employee suggestions. The
initial description of the committee, however, also states that the
results of the committee's deliberations will be used to implement
changes to certain company policies and health insurance benefit
plans, making it appear to be more than a mechanism for input.
The topics that the committee addresses also include a mandatory
subject of bargaining: benefits. Thus, General's committee is likely
to be characterized as a labor organization.
Although management does not appear to play a dominant role
in the committee's ongoing activities, the employer's influence per-
vades the committee's structure. The employer created the com-
mittee, devised the rules, determined the employee and
management complement, set the agenda and the meeting times,
created materials to review for the first meeting, and dictated its
purposes. Presumably, the committee would cease to exist if the
employer had no further need for it. Even if management's role on
an ongoing basis was minimal, its influence in dictating the entire
structure of the committee would likely amount to a violation of
§ 8(a)(2) of the Act.
St. Hospital, a religious-sponsored nonprofit institution located
in a rural area, uses a "shared governance" model to make major
decisions about managerial and clinical practice issues. The model
consists of three councils, each addressing a different subject-
clinical practice, quality improvement, and education. Each coun-
cil has responsibility for final decisions regarding its respective sub-
ject matter.
Employees sit on all three councils. St. Hospital created these
[Vol. 2
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councils because it wanted a strong line of communication between
hospital staff and hospital management. Management chairs each
council. The councils are completely funded by the hospital and
council members are paid for time spent on council activities.
Although St. Hospital's committees were created and structured
by management, they may well survive scrutiny under the Electro-
mation analysis. The purpose of the councils is to perform func-
tions traditionally within the discretion of management: quality
assurance, staff education, and supervision of clinical practice.
These management functions are not mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. Thus, the councils are not likely to fall within the statu-
tory definition of "labor organization." Hence, no § 8(a)(2)
violation could occur.
V. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MAINTAINING EPPs
Before creating or dissolving an EPP, the employer should bal-
ance the risks against the advantages of such action, including the
penalties that could result if the Board found that the EPP violated
§ 8(a)(2) of the Act. Though Electromation applies to both union
and non-union companies, it is likely that only a traditional labor
union would file an unfair labor practice charge.48 Such a charge
might be filed by a union that currently represents some of the
employees or by a union wishing to organize employees. If the
Board finds the challenged committees to be unlawful, the em-
ployer would most likely be ordered to disestablish the committees
and cease providing their support.
An employer of a unionized workforce should be aware that an
employer-dominated EPP could also violate the employer's duty to
bargain with the union's elected representative under § 8(a)(5) of
the Act.49 If the employer bargained with the EPP over changes
concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining, § 8(a)(5) would
likely be violated. 50 If § 8(a)(5) were also violated, the Board
would likely issue a bargaining order. Regardless of which of the
two statutory sections is violated, monetary penalties are unlikely
unless, pursuant to the EPP, the employer unlawfully reduced
wages or benefits.
The risk of an Electromation violation and a disestablishment
order, however, should not frighten employers into immediately
48. Though an employee could file an unfair labor practice charge, it is not likely the
employee would have any reason to do so if a union were not present.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
50. Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 78, at G-8 to G-9.
1993]
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dissolving their EPPs. The benefits of EPPs to employers and em-
ployees may outweigh the risks associated with maintaining them.
The employer has three options. First, it can choose not to use
employee committees, thereby foregoing all of the benefits of EPPs.
Second, an employer can maintain a potentially unlawful EPP and
risk a disestablishment order. Third, the employer can structure
its EPPs in one of the ways described so as to minimize the possi-
bility of a violation.
Although an employer may structure its EPPs in any one of the
three ways discussed to avoid a violation, there are trade-offs inher-
ent in each of the three methods. If the employer creates a com-
mittee that will act only as a unilateral mechanism for gathering
input (so as not to qualify as a labor organization), that may defeat
a principle purpose in creating the committee: allowing employees
to have an active role in meaningful decision making. A better
option may be to design the committee so that it does not concern
the mandatory subjects of bargaining-grievances, labor disputes,
wages, hours, or conditions of work. Keeping the committee from
discussing the prohibited topics may be difficult. If the employer
can accomplish it, though, the employer will be able to maintain as
much control over the committee as it desires, without fear of vio-
lating federal labor law.
A third option, minimizing the employer's domination, may be
the most difficult for the employer. First, minimizing the domina-
tion necessarily involves relinquishing control over the committee's
structure and its activities. Second, even if the employer were will-
ing to share control of the committee, the Board in Electromation
did not provide much guidance about how much control is too
much. The employer would thus remain at risk of a violation un-
less it abandoned virtually all control of the committee.
Employee participation programs can be valuable to both em-
ployers and employees. Despite the Electromation ruling, EPPs
need not be abandoned. Although employers may have concerns
about their EPPs, the decision did leave employers with options
that allow them to minimize or avoid altogether violations of fed-
eral labor law. Employers must weigh the potential risks of a vio-
lation against the considerable benefits derived from EPPs when
determining their proper course.
[Vol. 2
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